Introduction
In the past few years, smartphones have evolved from simple mobile phones into sophisticated mobile computers. Their capabilities make them very well suited to personal and business related activities. Smartphones, particularly Android, have become the major target for mobile malware due to our increased reliance on them for performing daily activities such as storing private data, socializing, emails, financial transactions, shopping etc.
Android being the most widely used platform for smartphones is under constant attacks. Existing end-point solutions such as anti-virus programs are not capable of completely eliminating the exponentially increasing malware threats due to their reliance on signature based detection. Moreover, resource constrained smartphones are not well suited to keep scanning for malware. There is a need for innovative detection solutions to overcome the current challenges of outdated signatures, code obfuscation and stealthy techniques used by malware apps.
Android's permission model is an effective mechanism against the misuse of system resources and user data; however, some of Android's features like intents can break the shield formed by the permission model. Permissions and intents promote the collaboration among applications by using each other's components and adding their permission landscape-enabling the formation of colluding applications. A lot of research is done on permissions; however intents are comparatively less investigated for malware detection. This research gap is creating more opportunity for the evolving colluding apps.
This work presents a novel methodology to fill the current research gap in Android malware detection. The proposed malware detection framework classifies the apps against certain distinguishing combinations of permissions and intents which are unique to the malware applications. These sets of permissions and intents form an efficient detection pattern to differentiate between the malware and benign applications with a granularity to classify the family of malware. We evaluate the efficacy of our approach with machine learning algorithms. A comparative study of classifiers against different performance measures is carried out to select the best classifier that yields the most accurate results. We apply an ensemble method to build up collaborative classification stage and obtain an optimized detection results.
Contributions. The main contributions presented in this paper are: 1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that combines intents and permissions for collaborative malware detection. This work combines permissions and intents of applications to generate a distinguishing matrix that is used for efficient and accurate detection of malware and its associated families. Our method is capable of achieving a 99% detection accuracy by combining permissions and intents. 2. We propose a new approach using ensemble methods to optimize the classification results. Our results show a detection accuracy of 99.8% by connecting multiple classifiers laterally with a meta-classifier. 3. We apply statistical significance testing to investigate the correlation between permissions and intents. We found statistical evidence of strong correlation between permissions and intents which could be exploited to detect malware applications.
Organization. Section 2 discusses the related work, Section 3 provides an overview of Android permission and intent mechanisms. Section 4 discusses the analysis of permissions and intents and Section 5 presents the proposed framework. Section 6 describes the model evaluation, experimental settings and results. Section 7 highlights the limitations of proposed approach. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
Related Work
There is a plethora of research work going on Android security spanning over vulnerability assessment, malware analysis and detection. An overview of the current malware trend is provided in the studies of (34; 33). Malware research leverages static, dynamic and hybrid analysis methods. In static malware classification, properties of application are extracted by analysing different features without actually running the code. In dynamic analysis, the runtime profiles of apps are generated by monitoring and collecting the statistics related to memory consumption, CPU usage, network traffic statistics and battery usage. Performance of dynamic methods degrades due to the resource constraints of mobile devices as they totally rely on runtime execution. Another limitation of dynamic methods is their reliance on certain temporal or event trigger related dependencies. PIndroid advances the research in Android malware detection using static analysis and machine learning methods. Here, we provide an overview of related efforts in this area.
Most of the detection approaches are built on permissions. (27) developed an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) based tool which analyses the permission used by the apps and identifies the unnecessary permissions (39; 35) . This tool is aimed to help the app developer rather than malware detection. Similar tools: Saint in (20) and Apex in (21) also use permissions to impose run-time constraints on the granted permissions. Another permission based tool-VetDroid developed by (29) investigates the internal usage methodology of permissions and rebuilds the permission behavior of apps. These tools are helpful for app developers and security analysts but they are not used for malware detection. Risks and benefits associated with permissions used by apps are analysed in (5) to help users to understand pros and cons of the apps. They used a very limited sample size of 121 malware apps for analysis. More recent works built on permissions are in (18) and (15) , they attained detection accuracies of 92% and 98% respectively, whereas our approach has achieved 99.8% accuracy by combining permissions with intents.
API calls and libc function calls are used in (23) to detect malware apps. Their approach is tested on a limited number of malware samples i.e., 681. Our proposed method achieves 99.8% accuracy when applied to 1745 applications. Andromaly proposed in (4) is also using API calls, system calls and some other features for malware detection. They achieved 99% detection but they tested their system on self-created malware applications. Hence the performance of the tool is unknown for the real malware applications. Crowdroid in (16) intercepts the system calls for analysis by a remote server which uses K-means clustering to group similar data. This tool is good for the detection of piggybacked applications only. DroidMat: proposed in (10) is a machine learning based tool which uses API calls and permissions to detect malware with 90% accuracy. A recent tool based on API calls is presented in (22) which can remotely generate trace files by monitoring the app running on mobile device. This tool can be used as a plug-in for malware detection system based on API calls. The authors in (24) have presented system calls based approach primarily to counter the system call injection attacks. This approach achieves more than 90% accuracy, however as a common drawback of all system call based approaches, this work also needs rooting of devise to analyse the binaries of call sequences. This work is extended in (25) by adding environment-aware malware behaviour to detect the environment-reactive malware applications.
ICC and intents have not been explored the way permissions and APIs have been investigated. Intent is a communication mechanism which facilitates to use the functionalities offered by components of applications (19) and (1) . Some very good studies are done on intents and Inter Process Communication (IPC), however the scope of those studies is limited to understanding the fundamentals rather than malware detection. (28) is the first work which has carried out a detailed investigation on IPC built on messaging systems. They have investigated different types of components and their importance in maintaining the Android security. (12) first time presented a tool: Com-Droid, which detects the ICC related vulnerabilities. They have investigated ICC and associated attack surfaces. They have tested their tool on a total of thirty applications. In (8) , authors have extended their previous work: Com-Droid by segregating the communication messages into two groups: inter and intra-applications respectively to reduce the risks of inter application attacks. In ((2)), authors developed a tool: JJB to check the Android components and their interaction. They investigated the risks associated with malformed and unexpected Intents. In a similar work in (3), some test scenarios of ICC vulnerabilities are generated and a method for testing the communication between the applications is presented.
Background on Permissions and Intents
Android uses permission and intent mechanisms to ensure the privacy of user and security of device resources. In this section, we present a high-level overview of Android permissions and intents.
Permissions
Permission framework plays a vital role in Android security. They control access to the vital system resources, data and sensitive device functionality. Different API calls related to device functionality are invoked with the permissions. Prior to the installation of an app, permissions in its manifest file are requested as a complete set. User has to accept all the requested permissions to install the app. There is no option for users who want to run new apps to choose among the requested permissions. Once granted, the permissions remain for the lifetime of app until either un-installed or updated. Users can only check the permissions of already installed applications on the device but they cannot remove/change the permissions. A feature to change the permissions was added in Android 4.2 but later removed through an update to avoid the crashing of application if any of the required permissions is mistakenly removed by the user.
Android permissions are categorized into four protection levels: Normal, Dangerous, Signature and Signature or System. Android has an access mechanism to check the permissions of apps and ascertain if the application should be granted access to the protected resources (6) . Normal permissions are automatically granted to the applications by the system without user's knowledge as these are not considered harmful for the user. Dangerous permissions need user's approval before the installation due to associated risk of privacy leaks and access to sensitive API calls (36; 37; 38). Signature permissions are granted only to those applications which are signed with the same certificate which defines the permission. Signature or system permissions are granted to applications either signed with the device manufacturer certificate or are pre-installed on the device making them unobtainable by the third party applications.
Intents
Intents are the basic communication mechanism used for exchanging inter-and intra-application messages. An intent conveys an intention of the application to perform an operation. It specifies the label of recipient component, its category and the action to be performed by the recipient on the supplied data.
Intents are of two types: Explicit and Implicit. Explicit intents specify the component exclusively by the class name. These are mostly used by apps to start their own components. Implicit intents do not specify a particular component by name. An app which uses an implicit intent specifies the required action then the system selects the application which has the particular component to handle the requested action. With explicit intents, the system launches the specified component immediately whilst with implicit intents, the system looks for the component by comparing the contents of intents with the intent filters of applications. If there is any match between the intent and intent filter, the component of that app is launched. In case of multiple matching intent filters, users are sent with a dialogue box to select the application for launching the component (7) .
Intents facilitate applications with the same user ID to invoke functionalities of each other without separately declaring permissions for that functionality. This enables them to gain extra privileges by augmenting each others' permissions.
Analysis of Permissions and Intents
Android has 145 permissions and 227 intents in version 4.4: API level 19 (API level is an integer value which identifies the application's compatibility with the Android versions), whereas in API level 1, this number was less (91 permissions and 124 intents). The increase in the number of permissions and intents has facilitated not only the increased functionality of mobile devices but also the potential openings for malware.
We carried out detailed investigation of 1300 real malware and 445 benign samples. These samples are collected from different official and third party sources such as Contagiodump, Genome, Virus Total, Google Play store, Appsapk and Androidmob. Malware samples are selected from different malware types and families to obtain distinguishing features from most of the available malware families. Benign apps are selected from different categories such as social, news, entertainment, finance, education, games, sports, music and audio, telephony, messaging, shopping, banking and weather for extracting usual patterns of normal apps.
Our investigation of the Android security framework and benign and malware samples resulted in some very interesting findings, primarily identifying permisions and intents as key features for malware propagation. These features play a vital role in controlling the access to device sensitive resources. Misused permissions and intents may facilitate the collaboration among applications to launch more sophisticated and stealthy attacks by sharing each other's capabilities and resources. We also establish that certain permissions and intents which are frequently used by malware apps are seldom used by benign apps. Malware families use a particular set of permissions and intents targeting specific capabilities and resources. Almost all the malware samples belonging to that particular family use a unique set of permissions and intents.
We present our findings in terms of how the malware applications use permissions and intents differently from benign applications. We also discuss how this distinct usage pattern may be exploited to detect malware apps.
Permission Usage by Applications
There are 58 permissions out of a total of 145 which are frequently used by the malware and benign applications whereas the remaining 87 are hardly ever used. We can group the often used permissions as normal and dangerous permissions on the basis of their use and associated risk level. Examples of frequently used permissions by benign apps are: Full Network access, Create/Add/remove/user accounts, Delete/Modify USB contents and Read/write/modify contacts. Malware apps usually use permissions: Read phone status/ID, Access Network state, Send SMS/MMS, Receive boot complete, Receive SMS, Delete/Modify USB contents and your location. There are a few malware friendly permissions, which are seldom used by the benign ones e.g., Access Network state, Receive boot complete, Restart packages, Mount/Unmount File system, Set wallpapers, Read/write history bookmarks of browser and Write APN settings. The top 25 permissions mostly used by malware apps are shown in Fig.1 .
The most popular benign apps such as YouTube, Skype and Viber tend to use on average 8 to 16 permissions while this number goes down to 3 to 6 for the least popular apps. The same trend can be observed in malware apps. The most harmful malware apps use more than 16 permissions and least harmful use 3 to 6 permissions. Number of permissions used by the most and least popular apps as well as the most and least harmful apps is shown in Fig. 2 .
Intent Usage by Applications
There are 35 intents out of 227 in Android version 4.4, which are frequently used by apps. The most popular benign apps usually use on average 1 to 4 intents and the least popular use 1 to 2. Similarly, the most harmful apps use a minimum of 5 and maximum of 8. Least harmful malware apps use at least 2 or 3 intents. Fig. 3 shows the overall trend of intents usage popular and harmful apps. Benign apps use only ACTION MAIN, CATEGORY LAUNCHER and CATEGORY DEFAULT intents whereas malware apps usually use more intents to gain extra capabilities. Mostly malware apps use BOOT COMPLETED, ACTION CALL, ACTION BATTERY LOW, SMS RECEIVE and NEW OUTGOING CALL.
Malware apps are seen to use a few of the normal permissions and intents whilst they use a significant number of dangerous permissions and intents. Benign apps show a similar trend of using only normal permissions and intents. These observations suggest that permissions and intents may be useful features to detect malware.
Threat Model
Android security framework relies on application sandboxing and permission framework to maintain isolation between different applications. All applications are considered as untrustworthy and each application runs as a separate process in its own virtual machine. By default, applications are allowed to access only their own files and allocated resources. However, applications may get access to the sensitive device resources and user data by acquiring permissions.
Despite their default isolation applications can communicate with each other using intent which is a legitimate message passing system. Using this communication mechanism, applications can share their components and resources. They add their permissions to perform the operations which they are unable to do individually. This augmentation of permissions through intents facilitates the collaborated malicious operations by malware applications.
Correlation between permissions and intents
Correlation is a technique for investigating the relationship between two quantitative variables. There are several correlation coefficients measuring the degree of correlation. The most common of these is the Pearson correlation coefficient (r), which is used to measures the strength of association between two variables. It is obtained by dividing the covariance of the two variables by the product of their standard deviations. Pearson's correlation coefficient has a value between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and 1 (perfect positive correlation).
Suppose we have n malware applications, each application using X dangerous permissions written as x i = {x 1 , x 2 ,..., x n } and Y dangerous intents such that y i = {y 1 , x 2 ,..., y n }, then the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) can be calculated using equation 1.
Two different sets of malware applications are used to measure the strength of correlation between dangerous permissions and dangerous intents. One set consists of 200 malware applications which are randomly chosen from different malware families and the other set consists of 20 malware applications from same malware family. For the first set of 200 malware applications, the correlation coefficient (r) equals 0.74, indicating a strong relationship between dangerous permissions and dangerous intents for p ¡ 0.001. Similarly, for the other set of 20 applications from same malware family the correlation coefficient (r) equals to 0.94, indicating a very strong correlation between dangerous permissions and intents in case of samples belonging to same malware class. The strong correlation between the dangerous permissions and intents supports our conjecture about the association between permissions and intents to launch the malware activity.
The Pearson correlation coefficients of 0.74 for different malware families and 0.94 for same malware families confirm the positive correlation between permissions and intents. However, we need to perform a significance test to decide whether or not there is any evidence which supports or contradicts the presence of a linear correlation in the whole population of malware applications. We use the hypothesis testing, for which we test the null hypothesis, H 0 , that malware applications use the same set of permissions and intents as the benign applications against the alternate hypothesis, H 1 , that malware applications do not use the same set of permissions and intents as the benign applications. For hypothesis testing, we use the Mann-Whitney U test with the p-value of 0.05. We calculate U 1 and U 2 values for both the permissions and intents respectively using equations 2 and 3 respectively. In following equations, R 1 and R 2 are the sums of ranks for permissions and intents respectively and n 1 and n 2 are the sample sizes for both the variables.
(2)
We take the smallest of U and compare it with the critical value obtained from the Mann-Whitney critical values table (14) . We use Mann-Whitney critical values table for small number of malware samples and Z-test for large samples of malware applications due to limitations of number of entries in the Mann-Whitney critical value table. With samples from same malware family (n 1 = 20, n 2 = 19, p=0.05, critical value = 119), the smallest U value obtained is 87 which is less than the critical value of 119, we would reject the null hypothesis for the malware applications belonging to same family. For a large sample of applications belonging to different malware families (n 1 = n 2 = 200, p=0.05, Z critical value = 1.64), we calculate z-score with Z test. We obtain z-score of 13.0594 which is greater than Z critical value hence suggesting the rejection of null hypothesis H 0 . We have very strong statistical evidence to accept the alternate hypothesis H 1 , which suggests that the malware and benign applications use different set of permissions and intents. This conjecture is further verified with normal distribution testing and classification analysis using different machine learning algorithms.
The normal distribution is important for statistical inference point of view (17) . We use box plots to test whether the sample distribution is normal. The box plots of permissions and intents related to benign and malware applications are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. The distribution appears to be approximately normal, with the upper whiskers longer than the Q1 to median distance and the box containing the middle 50% of the data almost tightly grouped in the centre of the distribution.
Malware Classification
We describe how the data is represented and then present a detailed description of our proposed system.
Data Representation
Our dataset consists of n applications from K classes with m features. Let C = {1, 2,..., K} are the set of indices of the classes, A = {1, 2,..., n} the set of indices of the applications and F = {1, 2,. ., m} the set of indices of the features. Also, let a k , k ∈ C and a k ⊆ A be the set of indices of applications belonging to class k. Additionally, let F j , j ∈ F be the domain of the jth feature. Let i th application, such that i ∈ A is represented as normal} and (f i,1 , f i,2 ,. .., f i,m ) is the number of permissions and intents used by ith applications, and f i,m ∈ {0,1} which indicates if the ith application uses mth feature. We compute the Information Gain (IG) of each feature x m against the class variable as follows:
; (4) Given that
Equation (4) can be simplified as
) .
Using equation (6), the features with highest IG are selected to train the model.
Probability Estimation
The probability of an application belonging to a particular class is calculated using Bayesian theorem:
An app is classified as malware if
System Description
The proposed system is shown in Fig. 6 . It consists of three main stages: Feature extractor, Pre-processor and Classifier.
Feature extractor analyses the applications (which are in APK file format). These files are decompressed to acquire the manifest file which is used to extract the permissions and intents. The extractor stage consists of two monitors which are used to measure: (i) type (normal or dangerous) and number of each type of permissions and (ii) type (normal or dangerous) and number of each type of intents. Permissions and intents are labelled into four groups: normal permissions, normal intents, dangerous permissions and dangerous intents. Dangerous permissions and dangerous intents are the ones which are most frequently used by the malware applications whilst normal permissions and normal intents are frequently used by the benign applications.
The pre-processor stage processes the extracted data to generate the vector dataset in an ARFF file format. The generated dataset is randomized using unsupervised instance randomization filter for better accuracy and sent to the classifier stage.
The classifier stage takes each monitored vector as input and classifies the dataset using trained classifier. Six machine learning classifiers: Nave Bayesian, Decision tree, Decision Table, Random Forest, Sequential Minimal Optimization and Multi Lateral Perceptron (MLP) are used for classification. Their performances are also compared in terms of different performance metrics.
Finally, the reporter stage generates notifications for the user based on the classifier results.
Evaluation

Experimental Setting
The experiments to evaluate the proposed system are carried out on an Intel Core i7-3520 M CPU @ 2.90 GHz, 2901 MHz machine with 8GB RAM. Each of the classifiers are evaluated with two methods: 10-fold crossvalidation and 80% split. In 10-fold cross-validation, the data set is divided into 10 subsets and the holdout method is repeated 10 times. In each round, one subset is taken as test set and the remaining nine subsets are combined to form the training set. Errors of all the ten rounds are averaged out to obtain a final output. This method ensures that each instance is included at least once in the test set and nine times in the training set. The final model is the average of all 10 iterations. The second method we use is 80% split, which uses 80:20 ratio (80% of a dataset for training and 20% for testing). This method is efficient but less accurate than the 10-fold method. In this section, we only report the results obtained with the 10-fold method.
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Performance Comparison of different Classifiers
Performance of six classifiers is evaluated and compared in terms of True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), accuracy, F1-score and Area Under Curve (AUC). These metrics are calculated using the confusion matrix (Table 1 ) generated from the four measures: True Positive (TP) -the number of correctly classified instances that belong to the class, True Negative (TN) -the number of correctly classified class instances that do not belong to the class, False Positive (FP) -instances which were incorrectly classified as belonging to the class and False Negative (FN) -instances which were not classified as class instances.
. Table 2 lists values obtained for TPR, FPR, Precision, F1-score, recall, AUC and model build-up time. Almost all the classifiers performed good with more than 90% of accuracy and TPR; however MLP and decision table out performed with TPR of 0.993 and accuracy of 0.995. SMO performed the lowest The SMO classifier hasve the lowest TPR and accuracy of all the five classifiers. Additionally, the classifiers are evaluated in terms of time taken to build up the model. The Nave Bayesian and decision tree took the least model buildup time of 0.01 sec whereas decision table also exhibits less time as compared to MLP and random forest. Overall Decision table is observed as the best classification algorithm . We achieve the best results with the Decision table and the lowest results with SMO in terms of performance metrics and model build up time. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is created by plotting the TPR against FPR at various threshold settings. ROC curve is drawn only with FPR and TPR as x and y axes respectively, which depicts relative tradeoffs between true positive (benefits) and false positive (costs). Generally, the best possible method would yield a point in the upper left corner or coordinate (0,1) of the ROC space, representing 100% sensitivity (no false negatives) and 100% specificity (no false positives), which is also called a perfect classification. A completely random guess would give a point along a diagonal line from the left bottom to the top right corners, which is also called the line of no-discrimination. Points above the diagonal represent good classification results and points below the line poor results. ROC curve for the Decision Table classifier yields almost perfect classification results and SMO gives less accurate results as shown in Figures 7 and 8 respectively.
Optimization with Ensemble methods
Ensemble methods combine the results of multiple machine learning algorithms to improve the predictive performance (26), (13) . Performance of ensemble learning may not always be better than the individual classifiers. The stacked performance depends on the selection of classifiers and methods used to combine the output predictions (32) .
We apply three ensemble methods namely Boosting, Bagging and Stacking to further improve the detection results. Stacking method yields the better results as compared to boosting and bagging. In stacking, multiple algorithms are trained individually with the training dataset and the outputs of these classifiers are sent to a meta-classifier which is trained to combine the predictions from individual classifiers and makes a final prediction. We use Decision Table, MLP and Decision tree classifiers at first stage and combine their results with three different schemes: Average of probabilities, Product of probabilities and Majority voting.
Average of probabilities. It takes an average of the probabilities of each class from the individual classifiers (k=3 for three classifiers) and compares which class has greater probability such that,
Benign, if P avg
Class malware > P avg
Class benign .
Product of probabilities. Product of probabilities is taken from each of the classifiers and highest probability of class is assigned as: 
Majority vote. Final result is decided based on the results obtained from majority of the results. Results of ensemble classification are depicted in Table 3 . Product of probabilities method gives the best results.
Limitations and Discussion
We currently apply static analysis approach to detect the malware applications. A dynamic analysis solution would have an advantage of detecting the malware in real-time detection. Static analysis has the advantage of identifying the malicious behaviour which is difficult to discover at runtime. It would be beneficial to combine static and dynamic analysis in future to leverage the advantages of both methods.
Presently the system can identify the malware applications however cannot identify the type of malware (ransom, spying, ads, etc). Identifying the type of malware applications would have the benefit of confirming the associated threat levels. It would help the users to understand the limitations of using such an application.
Conclusion
Android security framework relies on permission and intent mechanisms for controlling access to vital hardware and software resources. These two features have never been combined to investigate their effectiveness in the malware detection. This work proposes a novel malware detection method based on these two vital security features. We have used statistical and machine learning methods to ascertain the effectiveness of our conjecture. Our results confirm that the proposed system is very efficient and reliable for the malware detection. This work also compares the performance of different classification algorithms for the malware detection. Different ensemble methods are also investigated and applied on the proposed model to improve the detection accuracy. Some malware apps are also developed for Proof of Concept (PoC) purpose and to get an insight into the modalities and complexities of malware apps development.
We also investigate the Android methods used by the apps for possible collusion and found that permissions and intents are the basic essence of collusion. The fact that permissions and intents are the main features behind the application collusion, our proposed malware detection model is particularly suitable for detection of colluding applications in addition to other types of malware applications.
